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Abstract
A theoretical link between reasoning and mathematical ability 
has been supported by some recent empirical evidence. We 
argue that some of this evidence is indirect and measure 
selection may have influenced this relationship. We report 
one study in which mathematical ability was measured using 
a fluency and a calculation measure (Wood-cock Johnson-III, 
2001) and reasoning ability was measured using the extended 
cognitive reflection test (Toplack, West & Stanovich, 2014)
and a belief bias conditional reasoning task. Results from 68 
undergraduate students suggest that mathematical ability is 
predicted by performance on the cognitive reflection test but 
not conditional reasoning performance. We discuss the 
implications of these findings for research on the link between 
mathematical ability and reasoning skills.
Keywords: reasoning; mathematical ability; CRT (cognitive 
reflection test); conditional reasoning
Introduction
Research has established that a variety of general cognitive 
skills are necessary for mathematical success, such as 
working memory, inhibitory control and shifting skills 
(Cragg & Gilmore, 2014). More recently it has been 
suggested that logical reasoning skills are an important 
aspect of good mathematical reasoning abilities. We report a 
study which examines this link between reasoning and 
mathematical ability.
Reasoning and mathematical ability
Recent research on reasoning and mathematical ability 
suggests a close relationship between these two skill sets.
Ko and Knuth (2013) outline the type of reasoning skills 
used by mathematics majors, including informal deductive 
reasoning, example-based reasoning and further education 
in mathematics, compared to English, is associated with 
gains in reasoning ability, specifically in being able to reject 
invalid conclusions (Attridge & Inglis, 2013).
However, careful examination of some of the evidence 
suggests that the measures of reasoning ability are in fact 
frequently tapping into domain specific mathematical 
reasoning skills. For example, Nunes et al (2007) present 
evidence of a causal link between logical reasoning and 
mathematical ability in primary school children. However, 
logical competence was operationalized as the application of 
logical concepts in mathematics e.g. their understanding of 
the inverse relation between addition and subtraction, 
additive composition, one-to one and one-to-many 
correspondences, and seriation. Therefore, this specific 
study provides evidence for children’s mathematical 
knowledge being based on their understanding of its 
underlying logic, but this is not the same as suggesting that 
logical reasoning skills per se are required for good 
performance on mathematical tasks. This research merely 
provides evidence for close relationships between domain 
specific reasoning skills.
An additional factor that should also be acknowledged is 
the impact of task selection when measuring mathematical 
ability. Numerous studies attempting to establish a link 
between reasoning and mathematical ability have not used 
gold-standard measures of mathematical ability, and instead 
have used self-report questionnaires, brief experimental 
maths tasks or school achievement measures (Gomez-
Chacon, Garcia-Madruga, Vila, Elosua, & Rodriguez, 
2014). These issues with measure choice are problematic in 
terms of validity of results and decreasing the possibility of 
comparing between studies. 
Gomez-Chacon, et al. (2014) report that mathematics 
performance, as measured by mathematics scores at the end 
of a secondary school mathematics course, is correlated with
high cognitive reflection (as measured by the Cognitive
Reflection Test, Frederick, 2005) and overall reasoning 
performance (as measured by a battery of reasoning tasks, 
including propositional reasoning, syllogistic reasoning and 
probabilistic reasoning). However, there is little information 
about the tests used to assess mathematical ability and it is 
unclear how the individual reasoning tasks are related to 
mathematical performance.
Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis and Evans (2004) 
established a relationship between teacher-reported 
numeracy levels, a standardized mathematics measure and 
reasoning skills in a small sub-sample (N=32) of 10 - 11 
year old children. They used relational and conditional 
reasoning problems in which they varied the believability of 
the conclusions. Several indexes relating to logic and 
believability of the problems were highly correlated with 
numeracy skills. However, again it is unclear whether 
reasoning performance is related to specific numeracy skills. 
Vamvakoussi, van Dooren, and Verschaffel (2012) 
present evidence of intuitive reasoning in processing 
mathematical problems which are incongruent with natural 
number rules. The authors argue that this points to a 
distinction between system 1 and system 2 processing 
within mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear from 
this research whether the skills demonstrated by participants 
in these studies are domain specific or whether they draw on 
domain general reasoning processes.
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A recent study by Morsanyi, Devine, Nobes and Szucs 
(2013) attempts to shed some light on the question of 
whether mathematical achievement is related to the ability 
to engage in system 2 type analytical reasoning. Children 
with developmental dyscalculia were compared to typically 
developing children as well as children with outstanding 
mathematical abilities. While the authors report significant 
differences between the three groups it is important to note 
that the measure of reasoning performance (transitive 
inferences with believable and unbelievable premises and 
conclusions) was based on quantitative relations and hence 
it is not surprising that the children with developmental 
dyscalculia had difficulties with this task.
Some evidence suggests that deductive and mathematical 
processing draw on distinct neural substrates which implies 
that the two skills may be drawing on different cognitive 
systems (Kroger, Nystrom, Cohen & Johnson-Laird, 2008).
Based on our assessment of the current evidence, we 
conclude that the question of whether mathematical ability 
is related to domain general reasoning abilities has not been 
answered inconclusively.
Cognitive reflection test (CRT)
One measure that has recently attracted a lot of attention, 
both within the reasoning community but also as a measure 
of reasoning abilities in relation to mathematical abilities is 
the Cognitive reflection test – CRT (Frederick, 2005). The 
original CRT consists of three problems such as:
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar 
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
The intuitive, but incorrect, answer is 10 cents whereas the 
correct answer is 5 cents. These problems are meant to tap 
into a person’s tendency to either engage in heuristic Type I 
processing or analytical Type II processing.
However, the CRT has been criticized, as all of the 
problems also have a large mathematical component to 
them. For example, Welsh, Burns, and Delfabbro (2013) 
report a factor analysis of a series of decision style 
measures, cognitive tasks and the CRT which revealed that 
the CRT primarily loaded onto a factor with numerical 
ability measures. Hence, the authors conclude that the CRT 
is a primarily numerical measure as it only has predictive 
value for reasoning tasks for which numerical skill is 
required to reach the correct answer. Although, others have 
concluded that the CRT is not ‘just another numeracy scale’ 
(e.g., Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012). 
However, the CRT has also been criticized as it does not 
generalize to reasoning tasks which do not contain an 
arithmetic component, such as belief bias and matching bias 
syllogism tasks (Stupple, Gale & Richmond, 2013).
Therefore, it is difficult to establish the precise relationship 
between mathematical ability and reasoning skills due to the 
content overlap in measures. 
A better measure of reasoning ability
A well-established deductive reasoning task is the
conditional reasoning task. Participants are typically 
presented with a conditional premise, such as:
If the weather gets warmer then more people will go to the 
beach. 
followed by a minor premise such as: 
The weather gets warmer.
Participants are then either asked to make an inference or to 
select an inference from a set of options such as:
More people go to the beach
More people do not go to the beach
More people may or may not go to the beach
Four different inferences can be made from a conditional by 
either affirming or denying either the first part (the 
antecedent) or the second part of the conditional (the 
consequent) in the minor premise that follows the 
conditional. Affirming the first part of the conditional, as in 
the example above, results in the modus ponens inference of 
‘more people go to the beach’, which, according to 
propositional logic, is a valid inference. Similarly, denying
the consequent (e.g. not more people go to the beach) results 
in the equally valid modus tollens inference (e.g. the 
weather does not get warmer). The other two inferences, 
denial of the antecedent (e.g., the weather does not get 
warmer) and affirmation of the consequent (e.g., more 
people go to the beach) are not considered valid inferences, 
hence, one should conclude for both inferences that the 
proposed conclusion may or may not occur.
The valid modus ponens inference is fairly easy, with 
endorsement rates ranging between 89% and 100%. There is 
considerable variability in endorsement rates of the valid 
modus tollens and the invalid inferences (denial of the 
antecedent and affirmation of the consequent), particularly 
when the content of the materials is arbitrary (Evans, 
Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). 
Manipulating the believability of the initial conditional 
has an impact on the rate at which participants endorse all of 
the four inferences (e.g., Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009). 
When faced with an unbelievable conditional such as, 
If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will increase. 
Followed by a minor premise such as
Fast food is taxed
A participant has to deal with the conflict between what is 
logically correct (childhood obesity increases) and what is 
believable (childhood obesity does not increase). In this 
sense, this task is similar to the cognitive reflection task as a 
person must overcome their intuitive response and engage in 
analytical thinking in order to arrive at the correct response. 
The advantage of this task over the cognitive reflection task 
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is that it does not require any mathematical processing, but 
like the cognitive reflection task it requires the suppression 
of an intuitively appealing response. We felt it was 
important to retain this aspect of the reasoning measure in 
order to assess whether it is this ability to detect a conflict 
between an intuitive and a correct response which is driving 
the relationship between reasoning abilities and 
mathematical abilities.
Being sensitive to conflict in stimuli could be potentially 
useful for mathematical achievement. Geary, Bailey & 
Hoard (2009) established that children who were able to 
detect errors in a puppet’s counting procedure had higher 
mathematical achievement. Conflict detection could assist 
individuals to correctly establish the veracity of basic 
arithmetic problems, essential for self-monitoring and 
correct of performance (Campbell & Fugelsang, 2001).
The present study thus seeks to examine the relationship 
between mathematical and reasoning ability by employing 
gold-standard measures of mathematical ability and a 
reasoning task which does not rely on mathematical ability. 
However, we also include the CRT in order to examine its 
relationship with the mathematical measures and reasoning 
task we employ. 
In order to improve validity, the study will utilize 
standardized measures of mathematical achievement, the 
Wood-cock Johnson-III Math fluency test and the Wood-
cock Johnson-III calculation test (2001). The Math Fluency 
measure requires participants to complete as many simple 
arithmetic problems as possible in a set period of time, in 
contrast the un-timed calculation test requires more complex 
mathematical reasoning skills. We would anticipate a 
stronger association between performance on the general 
reasoning tasks and the calculation test, than with the 
fluency test due to the overlap in reasoning content between 
the two measures.
We therefore predict that mathematical ability as 
measured by the calculation task in particular will be related 
to performance on the cognitive reflection task and 
conditional reasoning task and that after taking 
mathematical fluency into consideration, the reasoning tasks 
will contribute to the prediction of mathematical ability.
Study
Method
Participants Seventy-four University of Leicester 
Psychology students participated in this study in return for 
course credit. However, six participants were removed prior 
to analysis as they had failed to follow the instructions for 
the Woodcock Johnson Mathematical Fluency task (they 
completed the calculations column by column rather than 
row by row, thus affecting the difficulty of the problems 
solved). The remaining 68 students had a mean age of 19.57 
years (range 18-46 years) and there were 13 male and 55 
female participants. All participants had a minimum grade C 
or equivalent GCSE in mathematics.
Materials and Design The study had a correlational design 
and all participants completed the same four measures. 
There were two measures of mathematical ability the Wood-
cock Johnson-III Math fluency test and the Wood-cock 
Johnson-III calculation test (2001). The fluency test is a 
measure of people’s ability to solve simple arithmetic 
calculations (e.g., 4 - 2) within a 3 minute time period. It 
includes 160 simple addition, subtraction and multiplication 
problems. The calculation test is a 45-item test used to 
assess more complex mathematical ability. The questions 
start with basic maths calculations and get progressively 
harder, reaching A-level (final year of secondary school) 
standard. Participants in this study started with item 14 on 
the calculation task due to the age of the sample.
Reasoning abilities were assessed using the extended 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplack, West & Stanovich, 
2014) which consists of 7 items. However, we omitted the 
last of the seven items as it necessitated a multiple choice 
response option, which the other items did not (see 
Appendix for the full set of items included). The six items 
were each presented on a separate page in 8 different 
counterbalanced orders.
The second reasoning measure was a belief bias 
conditional reasoning task, for which the materials were 
provided by Roser (2012-2015). Participants were presented 
with 32 conditionals together with a minor premise and 
three response options. For example:
Given
If oil prices continue to rise then UK petrol prices will rise.
Suppose
Oil prices continue to rise
Does it follow that
? UK petrol prices rise
? UK petrol prices do not rise
? UK petrol prices may or may not rise
Each problem was presented on a different page of the 
32 page booklet. Half of the conditionals had believable
content and the other half had unbelievable content, that is 
participants were presented with conditionals with 32 
distinct contents. Within each set of believable and 
unbelievable conditionals participants were presented with
four modus ponens, four modus tollens, four denial of the 
antecedent and four affirmation of the consequent 
inferences.1 The 32 conditional inferences were presented in 
different random orders to each participant.
Procedure Participants were tested in groups of up to 12 
people. Participants were advised to work in exam 
conditions, meaning in silence, independently, and without 
1 Due to an administrative error four participants did not see the 
full set of 32 conditionals, two participants only received 3 instead 
of 4 inferences of one type and two participants were not given one 
set of inferences, e.g. they did not receive the four believable 
affirmation of the consequent inferences.
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the use of calculators. The four tasks were completed in four 
different orders. Participants either started with the fluency 
measure or with the CRT and after completing the first two 
tasks either completed the calculation task or the conditional 
reasoning task. The fluency task was timed and participants 
had to complete as many items as possible in three minutes. 
All other tasks were completed at the participants’ own 
pace. When completing the calculation task, as per 
standardized administration rules, the experimenters advised 
the participants to move on to the next task (or finish if this 
was their last task) when the experimenters noted that they
had 6 consecutive incorrect answers. The test battery took 
approximately 40 – 45 minutes in total to complete, with a 
small minority of participants completing it in 30 minutes or 
60 minutes.
Instructions for the conditional reasoning task:
This booklet contains 32 statements. The statements and 
associated tasks are about how people think in their daily 
lives and are not tests of intelligence. Please read each 
statement carefully and decide which conclusion follows. 
Please answer the questions in the order in which they are 
presented and do not try to change your answers once you 
have written them.
Instructions for the CRT:
This booklet contains six items that vary in difficulty.
Answer as many as you can.
For the two maths tasks, participants received the 
standardised verbal instructions. 
Results
Table 1 displays the mean scores on the four measures the 
participants completed. Participants scored a mean of 
103.53 out of a possible 160 on the fluency measure and a 
mean of 15.26 out of a possible 32 on the calculation task. 
Performance on the cognitive reflection task was fairly poor
with a mean number of correct responses of 1.18 out of 6 
and as can be seen from Table 1 the majority of incorrect 
responses were the intuitive ones (mean 3.35). 
Table 1: Mean Scores (standard deviations in parenthesis) 
for the four measures.
Task Mean (SD)
Fluency 103.53 (23.24)
Calculation 15.26 (5.44)
CRT correct
CRT intuitive
1.18 (1.44)
3.35 (1.55)
CRT incorrect
Conditionals 
(proportion logically 
consistent inference)
1.47 (1.06)
.48 (.10)
For the conditional reasoning task we calculated a score of 
the number of logically consistent inferences (i.e., we 
counted the number of endorsements of the modus pones 
and modus tollens inferences, and the number of times 
participants did not endorse the affirmation of the 
consequent and denial of the antecedent inferences) and 
converted these scores into proportions due to the fact that a 
small number of participants had not received the same 
number of conditional inferences (see footnote 1). This 
score gave us a logic index which we could use for our 
analyses. However, we also present the responses to the 
conditional reasoning task in the customary way of 
endorsement rates for each inference in Figure 1. A 2x4 
ANOVA on the endorsement rates confirmed that the 
believability manipulation of the conditional reasoning task 
had been successful. There was a main effect of 
believability; F(1,65) = 26, p < .001, n2 = .286 indicating 
that the participants endorsed the believable inferences more 
than the unbelievable inferences. There was also a main 
effect of inference, F(3,195) = 7.35, p < .001, n2 =.102, with 
participants endorsing the modus ponens inference more 
than any of the other inferences.
Figure 1. Mean accuracy rate (according to formal 
logic) for each of the four inferences by believable and 
unbelievable condition.
As can be seen from Table 2, the fluency measure only 
correlated with the calculation measure, r = .49, N = 68, p <
.001. The calculation measure was correlated most strongly 
with the number of correct responses on the CRT, r = .36, N 
= 68, p =.003. However, the proportion correct responses on 
the conditional reasoning task was also moderately 
correlated with the calculation task, r = .24, N = 68, p =
.047. But an examination of the correlations between the 
calculation task and the different conditional inferences 
revealed no significant correlations; rs< .12, ps > .16. The 
CRT and the conditionals task were also moderately 
correlated, r = .271, N = 68, p =.026. Interestingly, this 
correlation between CRT and the conditionals task is driven 
by a correlation between correct inferences on the 
believable conditionals, r = .257, N = 68, p = .034 and not 
by a correlation between unbelievable inferences and CRT, 
r = .154, p = .21.
636
Table 2. Correlations between the four measures
1 2 3
1.Fluency
2. Calculation .487**
3. CRT (correct) .182 .357**
4. Proportion Correct
Conditionals
.122 .242* .271*
Examination of the correlations between the CRT and the 
different conditional inferences suggested that there were no 
(for modus ponens inferences) or negative (for modus 
tollens inferences) correlations between CRT performance 
and the valid inferences and there were positive correlations 
between CRT and the invalid inferences (affirmation of the 
consequent and denial of the antecedent). Hence we 
examined whether participants who made the correct 
inference for the invalid inferences (i.e. chose the option 
that the conclusion may or may not be drawn) performed 
better on the CRT. Indeed there was a positive correlation 
between the CRT and the correct inferences for the invalid 
inferences, r = .377, N= 68 p =.002.
A hierarchical regression with fluency entered at step 1 
and CRT correct and proportion correct on the conditionals
task to predict calculation scores indicates that fluency 
accounted for 24% of the variance in calculation scores 
(F(471.332, 22.938) = 20.55, p < .001) and that the addition 
of the two reasoning measures added .089 to R2, thus 
accounting for 33% of the variance in calculation scores (the 
R2 change was significant, F = 4.209, p = .019). Inspection 
of the beta weights for the final model revealed that fluency 
was the best predictor; beta = .428 (t=4.085, p < .001) and 
CRT correct also added significantly to the prediction; beta 
= .246 (t =2.28, p = .026), but performance on the 
conditional reasoning task was not a significant predictor.
Discussion
The key finding from this study is that while conditional 
reasoning performance is correlated with mathematical 
ability as measured by the Wood-cock Johnson-III 
calculation test (2001), it does not predict performance on 
this task when mathematical fluency is taken into account. 
The cognitive reflection task however does predict 
performance on the calculation task. Hence, this study 
provides further support for the idea that the relationship 
between the CRT and mathematical achievement is driven 
by the mathematical component of the task. 
We acknowledge a potential limitation of our study is that 
that mathematical education levels were not recorded for 
our participants, although we do know that all our 
participants had at least a grade C or equivalent in 
Mathematics at GCSE level. Furthermore, the measures of 
mathematical ability included in this study are sensitive 
standardized measures and so we are confident that these
measures give us a fair reflection of the participants’ 
mathematical abilities.
In terms of the relationship between mathematical ability 
and reasoning ability, we argue that future studies 
examining this relationship must take into consideration 
whether they are investigating a relationship between 
domain specific (mathematical) reasoning skills or more 
domain general reasoning skills. We acknowledge that our 
domain general reasoning measure relied heavily on verbal 
abilities and so we propose that future studies should also 
include a non-verbal reasoning measure in order to assess 
whether abstract reasoning skills are linked to mathematical 
calculation skills. It is thus still unclear whether reasoning 
per se is essential for mathematical achievement or whether 
these are independent cognitive skills as suggested by 
Kroger et al (2008) who reported that different brain areas 
are linked to mathematical and reasoning processes. An 
alternative hypothesis worth pursing is whether 
mathematical and reasoning abilities are linked due to their 
relationship with more domain-general characteristics of 
intelligence.
Another interesting finding from this study is the fact the 
CRT was only correlated with good performance on the 
believable conditionals and not with performance on the 
unbelievable conditionals. Arguably, good performance on 
the CRT requires a person to recognize a conflict when 
considering the intuitive answer which results in a more 
considered response. Similarly, good performance on the 
unbelievable conditionals requires a person to recognize the 
conflict between believability and logic before they can 
recognize the correct inference. The fact that this aspect of 
the conditionals task was not related to CRT performance 
suggests that further investigation into what the CRT is 
measuring is also warranted. 
Acknowledgments
We thank Matt Roser for supplying the materials for the 
conditional reasoning task and Priscilla Baafi, Sach Dhesi 
and Mesel Teklebrhan for their assistance in data collection.
References 
Attridge, N. & Inglis, M., (2013). Advanced mathematical 
study and the development of conditional reasoning skills. 
PLoS ONE, 8, e69399.
Campbell, J., & Fugelsang, J. (2001). Strategy choice for 
arithmetic verification: Effects of numerical surface form. 
Cognition, 5, 1-39.
Cragg, L. & Gilmore, C. (2014). Skills underlying 
mathematics: The role of executive function skills in the 
development of mathematics proficiency. Trends in 
Neuroscience and Education, 3, 63-68.
Evans, J. S. B. T., Handley, S. J., & Bacon, A. M. (2009). 
Reasoning under time pressure. Experimental Psychology, 
56, 77-83.
637
Evans, J. S. B. T., Newstead, S. E., & Byrne, R. M. J. 
(1993). Human reasoning : the psychology of deduction. 
Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive Reflection and Decision 
Making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 24-42.
Geary, D., Bailey, D., & Hoard, M. (2009). Predicting 
Mathematical Achievement and Mathematical Learning 
Disability With a Simple Screening Tool. Journal of 
Psychoeducational Assessment, 27, 265-279.
Gomez-Chacon, I. M., Garcia-Madruga, J. A., Vila, J. O., 
Elosua, M. R., & Rodriguez, R. (2014). The dual process 
hypothesis in mathematics performance: Beliefs, 
cognitive reflection, working memory and reasoning. 
Learning and Individual Differences, 29, 67-73.
Handley, S. J., Capon, A., Beveridge, M., Dennis, I., Evans, 
J. St. B.T. (2004). Working memory, inhibitory control 
and the development of children’s reasoning. Thinking 
and Reasoning, 10, 175-195.
Ko, Y. & Knuth, E. J. (2013). Validating proofs and 
counterexamples across content domains: Practice of 
importantce for mathematics majors. The Journal of 
Mathematical Behavior, 32, 20-35.
Kroger, J., Nystrom, L. E., Cohen, J. D., & Johnson-Laird, 
P. N. (2008). Distinct neural substrates for deductive and 
mathematical processing. Brain Research, 1243, 86-103.
Liberali, J. M., Reyna, V. F., Furlan, S., Stein, L., & Pardo, 
S. T. (2012). Individual differences in numeracy and 
cognitive reflection, with implications for biases and 
fallacies in probability judgment. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 25, 361-381.
Morsanyi, K., Devine, A., Nobes, A., & Szucs, D. (2013).
The link between logic, mathematics and imagination: 
evidence from children with developmental dyscalculia 
and mathematically gifted children. Developmental 
Science, 16, 542-553.
Nunes, T., Bryant, P., Evans, D., Bell, D., Gardner, S., 
Gardner, A., & Carraher, J. (2007). The contribution of 
logical reasoning to the learning of mathematics in 
primary school. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 25, 147-166.
Roser, M. (2012-1015). Dual processes in reasoning: A 
neuropsychological study of the role of working memory. 
ESRC grant RES-062-23-3285.
Stupple, E. J. N., Gale, M. & Richmond, C. (2013). 
Working Memory, Cognitive Miserliness and Logic as 
Predictors of Performance on the Cognitive Reflection 
Test In M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, & I. Wachsmuth 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1396-1401). Austin, TX: 
Cognitive Science Society.
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). 
Assessing miserly processing: An expansion of the 
Cognitive Reflection Test. Thinking & Reasoning, 20,
147-168.
Vamvakoussi, X., van Dooren, W., & Verschaffel, L.
(2012). Naturally biased? In search for reaction time 
evidence for a natural number bias in adults. The Journal 
of Mathematical Behavior, 31, 344-355.
Welsh, M., Burns, N. & Delfabbro, P. (2013). The 
Cognitive Reflection Test: how much more than 
Numerical Ability? In M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, 
& I. Wachsmuth (Eds.), Proceedings of the 35th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1587-
1592). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Woodcock, R. W., McGrew, K. S., & Mather, N. (2001). 
Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement (WJ III). 
Riverside Publishing.
Appendix
Examples of conditional reasoning task
Believable Modus Ponens
If car ownership increases then traffic congestion will get 
worse
Car ownership increases 
---
Believable Denial of the Antecedent
If jungle deforestation continues then gorillas will become 
extinct
Jungle deforestation does not continue
---
Unbelievable Modus Tollens
If fast food is taxed then childhood obesity will increase
Childhood obesity does not increase
---
Unbelievable Affirmation of the Consequent
If the lottery prize-money increases then fewer people will 
buy tickets
Fewer people buy tickets
---
Additional items for extended CRT
(1) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and 
Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how 
long would it take them to drink one barrel of water 
together? _____ days [correct answer = 4 days; 
intuitive answer = 9]
(2) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th 
lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the 
class? ______ students [correct answer = 29 students; 
intuitive answer = 30]
(3) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back 
for $80, and sells it finally for $90. How much has he 
made? _____ dollars [correct answer = $20; intuitive 
answer = $10]
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